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Strategic Parasitism, Professional 
Strategists and Policy Choices
The Influence of George Lindsey and Robert 
Sutherland on Canadian Denuclearisation, 
1962-1972 
J O H N  K E E S S
Abstract : Between 1957 and 1963, Canada acquired numerous nuclear 
delivery systems to fulfill commitments to the defence of North America 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In 1972, Pierre 
Trudeau’s government divested most of these systems. Much of the literature 
ascribes Trudeau’s decision to purely political reasons. By examining the 
contributions of two operational researchers from the Defence Research 
Board, Dr. R.J. Sutherland and Dr. George Lindsey, this article assesses 
the influence of professional advice on denuclearisation. This research 
has found that Lindsey and Sutherland provided a strategic grammar 
which helped shape the nature and timing of partial denuclearisation.
In 1963, canadIan defence scIentIst Dr. R.J. Sutherland gave an extraordinary talk at the National Defence College. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis had occurred the year before, NATO 
was working through tortuous arrangements for the allied control 
of nuclear weapons and the Sino-Soviet split was metastasising.1 
Sutherland surveyed these developments from a Canadian point of 
view. The balance of world power had tilted inexorably toward the 
big powers, with significant consequences for small countries like 
1  R.J. Sutherland, “Trends in Strategic Weapons and Concepts – Lecture to the 
National Defence College by R.J. Sutherland,” 11 March 1963, III.72, vol. 1, 87/253, 
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, Directorate of Heritage and History (DHH). 
© Canadian Military History 2020
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Canada. Unhappily, it forced a rethink of Canada’s nuclear policy 
after six gruelling years of negotiation, acquisitions and planning. 
Significantly, many of Sutherland’s ideas presaged those of the 
much better known Hans J. Morgenthau in his influential “The 
Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy,” published the following year.2 
Sutherland expressed original and innovative thinking in an era 
of Canadian strategic thought that would later be taken by some 
as “a posture of dependence for intellectual nourishment upon the 
debates of others”—a state described by Colin S. Gray as “strategic 
theoretical parasitism.”3
More parochial concerns soon dominated the minds of the officers 
in the lecture hall. In 1964, Lester B. Pearson’s Liberal government 
tabled the 1964 White Paper on Defence, starting a wave of changes 
over the next twenty years that are widely seen to have ended the 
“golden age” of Canada’s peacetime military.4 These reforms, which 
accelerated under the government of Pierre Trudeau, encompassed 
everything from uniforms to bilingualism and the reduction of 
Canada’s NATO commitment. One key element of this shift was 
the divestment of nuclear weapons: having acquired a significant 
arsenal of nuclear surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), air-to-air rockets, 
gravity bombs and surface-to-surface rockets in 1963 and 1964, the 
Canadian government retired all of these systems in 1972 save the 
air-to-air rockets, which were finally taken out of use in 1984.
To some historians and commentators, nuclear divestment 
embodies political meddling in operational matters with the resultant 
military decline—a symptom of the amateurism and naiveté of 
outsiders who had unfortunately gained access to the policy-making 
machinery.5 Although there has been extensive research into Canadian 
2  Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy,” The American 
Political Science Review, 58, 2 (March 1964): 23-35.
3  Peter Kasurak, A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003), 72-73; and Colin S. Gray, 
“The Need for Independent Canadian Strategic Thought,” Canadian Defence 
Quarterly 1, 1 (Summer 1971): 6-12.
4  J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian 
Foreign Policy (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1990), 234; and John A. English, Lament for an Army: 
The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism (Toronto: Irwin, 1998), 51.
5  Sean Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons During the 
Cold War (Washington: Potomac Books, 2007), 373. See also Gray, “The Need for 
Independent Canadian Strategic Thought,” 6.
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nuclear weapons acquisition, comparatively little has explored the 
reasons for divestment. Sean Maloney has written a well-researched 
book on Canada’s relationship with nuclear weapons, but its emphasis 
is overwhelmingly on decisions to acquire particular systems between 
1951 and 1964, with very little to be said about denuclearisation—
in fact, only four dedicated pages.6 Erika Simpson, in NATO and 
the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics, puts forward 
the interesting thesis that two groups of policy makers—pro-nuclear 
“defenders” who “feared abandonment” and anti-nuclear “critics” who 
“feared entrapment”—drove policy making.7 However, by emphasising 
groups of individuals and their foundational experiences, Simpson’s 
analysis de-emphasises very real and important technological and 
strategic changes throughout the period. She also devotes little space 
to divestment. Andrew Richter, in Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian 
Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1963, takes a different 
view. Richter contests Gray’s “parasitism” thesis by highlighting 
the rich operational research (OR) work on the subject of nuclear 
weapons that built up in Canada during the 1950s and early 1960s. 
But Richter’s study ends in 1963, meaning that the OR contribution 
to denuclearisation is not present in the historical record.8 Even 
the technical history published by John Clearwater provides only a 
short summary of divestment.9 There seems to be some agreement 
that divestment came primarily from political sources and especially 
from Pierre Trudeau—a sort of Trudeau ex machina, marked by 
“the triumph of the amateurs over the professionals.”10 Because this 
stated assumption has not been examined in significant detail, it is 
worth asking: did any professional strategists influence the decision 
to denuclearise?
This article has found that a long line of strategic thinking in 
the Canadian operational research community, particularly by R.J. 
Sutherland and George R. Lindsey, influenced the decision to partially 
denuclearise in 1972. Gray can be forgiven for presuming a lack of 
6  Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 369-73.
7  Erika Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 41, 72.
8  Andrew Richter, Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear 
Weapons (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002), 6-7.
9  John Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada’s Cold 
War Arsenal (Toronto: Dundurn, 1998), 73-74, 172-73, 215-16.
10  Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 372.
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strategic thinking in Canadian defence policy. The Defence Research 
Board’s (DRB) operational researchers produced numerous studies 
that framed Canadian nuclear commitments in a wider strategic 
context, but long walls of classification hid their work. Fortunately 
for the student of Canadian military history and defence policy, 
academics have begun to chip away at previously classified archival 
materials. Richter’s Avoiding Armageddon has been complemented 
by a growing academic interest in the contributions of the Canadian 
OR community. J.S. Ridler and Jonathan Turner have both written 
excellent PhD dissertations on the influence of the DRB and Matt 
Wiseman has published a very helpful collection of George Lindsey’s 
work from the Laurier Military History Archives.11 
This survey will unfold in four broad areas. Firstly, the paper 
provides a brief technical and political background to the divestment 
debate. It will then examine how the Cuban Missile Crisis and 
other strategic developments in the 1960s affected discussions and 
commitments surrounding nuclear weapons in the 1964 White 
Paper on Defence. The paper will also examine how evolving 
thought around the topic of deterrence and nuclear weapons affected 
the major nuclear policy decisions of the Pearson and Trudeau 
governments. Finally, in light of the decision to pursue partial 
denuclearisation in 1972, this paper will assess the contributions of 
the OR community to the 1969 Defence Policy Review (DPR) and 
the 1971 Defence White Paper.
background: nuclear weapons, alliances and 
operational research
Before looking too deeply into the impact of Lindsey’s and 
Sutherland’s thinking, it is worth discussing what operational 
research is and how it was conducted in Canada during the early 
Cold War. Operational research, classically defined, is “the scientific 
11  Jonathan Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977” (PhD 
dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012); Jason Sean Ridler, “State Scientist: 
Omond McKillop Solandt and Government Science in War and Hostile Peace, 1939-
1956” (PhD dissertation, Royal Military College of Canada, 2001); and Matthew 
S. Wiseman, ed., The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey: Operational Research, 
Strategic Studies and Canadian Defence in the Cold War (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2019).
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method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis 
for decisions regarding the operations under their control.”12 The 
field originated during the Second World War when the Royal Air 
Force (RAF) applied quantitative analysis to improve the British 
response to German bombing raids. By combining expertise in 
physics to optimise the placement of radar stations with a detailed 
statistical breakdown of German attack patterns, British operational 
researchers gave RAF leadership critical advice on the timing of 
defensive patrols and the organisation of effective command and 
control structures.13 The Royal Navy and British Army took note 
and soon OR methods were being applied by all three British 
services with enthusiastic support from operational research teams 
established by the Canadian services.
This early flowering of OR soon encountered a post-war frost. 
The Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal 
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) disbanded their OR sections as part 
of demobilisation in 1945, but they quickly regretted the decision 
as the need for a national OR capability became clear. In 1949, the 
services and the Defence Research Board (DRB) —the Department 
of National Defence’s (DND) larger body for coordinating defence 
research established in 1947—agreed to revive an OR capability by 
coordinating and partially amalgamating the various services’ research 
sections through  a new Operational Research Group (ORG).14 The 
ORG’s original function was to provide a pool of civilian scientists 
to conduct research across each of the military’s services, prevent 
duplication and oversee limited tri-service research.15 
Lindsey and Sutherland played important parts in the early years 
of Canada’s Cold War OR community. They had much in common. 
Both men had experience serving in the Second World War—Lindsey 
with Royal Canadian Artillery, Canadian Operational Research 
Group and the British Army Research Group, and Sutherland with 
12  D.J. Goodspeed, A History of The Defence Research Board of Canada (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1958), 162.
13  Goodspeed, A History of The Defence Research Board of Canada, 162-63.
14  The operational research section changed names several times, including 
Operational Research Establishment (ORE), Defence Operational Research 
Establishment (DORE) and Defence Research and Analysis Establishment (DRAE). 
In internal documents from the period these titles were often used interchangeably. 
For the purposes of this paper, either the period-appropriate acronym or DRAE will 
be used to describe the DRB’s OR section.
15  Goodspeed, A History of The Defence Research Board of Canada, 168-69.
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The Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians).16 Both gained their 
PhDs after the war— Lindsey in nuclear physics and Sutherland 
in economics. And both began their post-war operational research 
careers shortly after the ORG’s founding; Lindsey joined to begin 
work with the RCAF on continental defence programmes while 
Sutherland was deployed to Korea as part of the Canadian Army’s 
OR section.17 By the late 1950s, both researchers came to work on 
continental defence questions and became close friends.18 In 1963, 
after Sutherland became head of the ORG, he wrote of Lindsey as 
“the most able operational research man…not only in Canada, but in 
any other country.”19 Coming from someone described as “Canada’s 
one man equivalent to the RAND Corporation,”20 this was no mean 
praise. Though very little correspondence between them is found in 
archival sources, it is clear that they had a close relationship based 
on close collaboration and mutual respect.
As the 1950s progressed, the ORG’s independent role grew as 
changing technological and strategic problems outgrew individual 
service imperatives. In particular, the challenge posed by 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) came under the ORG’s 
direct purview in the late 1950s.21 As the strategic situation became 
more complex in the 1960s, the quantitative focus of traditional 
operational research  stretched to include questions of larger political 
significance, specifically the strategic position  that small states 
encountered as they sought to navigate the superpower rivalry 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. This wide scope 
made the ORG an important institution. Indeed, until the 1970s 
few organisations outside of the military’s OR community, uniformed 
16  Wiseman, The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey, xvii-xviii; and James Lee and 
David Bellamy, “Dr. R.J. Sutherland: A Retrospective,” n.d., III.0, vol. 5, 87/253, 
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
17  Wiseman, The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey, xx; and Lee and Bellamy, 
“Dr. R.J. Sutherland: A Retrospective,” III.0, vol. 5, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland 
fonds, DHH. For an understanding of Sutherland’s work with the Canadian Army 
Operational Research Establishment, see A.B. Godefroy, In Peace Prepared: 
Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s Cold War Army (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2014).
18  Lee and Bellamy, “Dr. R.J. Sutherland: A Retrospective,” n.d., III.0, vol. 5, 
87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
19  Wiseman, The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey, xxii.
20  Lee and Bellamy, “Dr. R.J. Sutherland: A Retrospective,” n.d., III.0, vol. 5, 
87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
21  Goodspeed, A History of The Defence Research Board of Canada, 169.
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advisors, and a smattering of individual academics systematically 
studied strategic issues from a Canadian point of view.22 One downside 
to this relatively insular community was that thinking stayed inside 
the Canadian defence and foreign affairs establishment. Sutherland, 
one of the most original and innovative strategic thinkers in Canada, 
published only two papers in public journals and collections, with 
most of his work remaining classified until the 1990s and 2000s. 
Much of his work is still restricted.23 Lindsey published more widely, 
but most of his major contributions came after 1972.24
Within government, however, Sutherland’s and Lindsey’s work 
circulated widely and their analyses carried considerable weight. Both 
men headed the ORG during crucial points in the denuclearisation 
decision—Sutherland from 1963 to 1967 and Lindsey from 1967 
until DRB’s reorganisation in the 1970s.25 As respective heads of the 
operational research section, they had access to both the minister 
of national defence and senior military leadership and were often 
asked to comment on specific military programmes, concepts and, 
on occasion, even drafted speeches.26 They presented directly to 
the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence 
(SCEAND) and replied directly to queries for comment by Deputy 
Ministers and Assistant Deputy Ministers on government papers.27 
During the nuclear acquisition debate, for example, most of the papers 
that went to the minister first passed Sutherland’s desk. Tellingly, 
policy makers outside their normal bureaucratic chain recognised 
22  J.H. Trotman, “A Canadian National Policy Research Institute,” 27 August 1968, 
10.1, vol. 2, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
23  Lee and Bellamy, “Dr. R.J. Sutherland: A Retrospective,” III.0, vol. 5, 87/253, 
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
24  Wiseman, The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey, xvii.
25  Wiseman, The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey, xxv; and John W. Mayne, 
History of Operational Research in the Royal Canadian Air Force (Ottawa: 
Department of National Defence, 1979), 52.
26  R.J. Sutherland to Robert Miller (presumed), correspondence, 5 November 1962, 
III.45, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH. See also Frank Maas, The 
Price of Alliance: The Politics and Procurement of Leopard Tanks for Canada’s 
NATO Brigade (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017), 23-24; 
Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 126; and Kasurak, A National Force, 93.
27  George R. Lindsey, Strategic Weapons Systems, Stability, and the Possible 
Contribution by Canada (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1969). The 
forward to this document notes that it “is almost identical with the one prepared for 
the information of the members of the Commons Standing Committee on External 
Affairs and National Defence.”
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R.J. Sutherland in 1963. [Duncan Cameron/Library and Archives Canada/PA-166257]
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Sutherland’s and Lindsey’s contributions. Canadian diplomat Basil 
Robinson, who served as both the Department of External Affairs’ 
liaison to Diefenbaker and later as Undersecretary of State for 
External Affairs thought of Sutherland as a “strategist.”28 Some at 
the Department of External Affairs (DEA) thought George Lindsey 
was influential enough to consider him a threat. In the words of 
Michael Pittfield, the Assistant Secretary to the Privy Council during 
the defence reviews, “the last thing [some at DEA] wanted was to 
allow George Lindsay [sic] to exist.”29 While assessing influence is 
inherently circumstantial, there are few better indicators than open 
rivalry. Given their wide circulation in government, it is possible to 
plausibly gauge Lindsey’s and Sutherland’s impact by understanding 
how they approached complex technical subjects such as deterrence 
theory, how they expressed these understandings to policy makers 
and then contrasting their understandings and recommendations 
with changes in executive documents, such as policy statements and 
white papers.
Before discussing Canadian nuclear weapons policy, it is important 
to clarify just what those weapons were, when they were acquired 
and the reasons for their adoption. When Canada first signed on to 
NATO in 1949, it was primarily a political pact that included a set of 
military assurances without much detailed military planning.30 This 
changed radically with a series of developments in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, notably the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949), the first 
Soviet atomic (1949) and hydrogen (1952) weapons tests, and the 
Korean War (1950-1953). In 1951, the members of NATO agreed to 
establish a force-in-being, directed by Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe under the leadership of General Dwight Eisenhower as 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).31 Between 1950 and 
1952, Canadian defence spending tripled. Ottawa quickly assembled 
and despatched a ground formation, which after a few name changes 
28  Henry Basil Robinson, interviewed by Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, 
5 August 1987, Ottawa, Accession 20150335, George Metcalf Archival Collection, 
Canadian War Museum Military History Research Centre (MHRC). 
 Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 20.
29  Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, Trudeau’s World: Insiders Reflect on 
Foreign Policy, Trade and Defence, 1968-1984 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2017), 39.
30  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “A Short History of NATO,” accessed 14 
April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm.
31  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “A Short History of NATO.”
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settled as 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (4 CIBG) in 1957. 
An air component, which would become 1 Canadian Air Division (1 
CAD) in 1952, began moving its first units to Europe in 1951.32
Although Canadian political leaders did not envision nuclear 
acquisitions as part of this increased defence spending, events quickly 
brought the nuclear issue to the fore. In 1949, the Allies began 
drafting a series of military concepts to align acquisitions, operational 
planning and force contributions. After it became clear to the planners 
that NATO could not credibly match Soviet conventional forces in 
continental Europe, they increasingly relied on nuclear weapons to 
bridge the gap. Early NATO strategic concepts, expressed as Military 
Committee (MC) resolutions, stressed nuclear retaliation similar in 
form to the combined bomber offensive of the Second World War to 
deter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.33 During the 1950s, the 
nature of nuclear weapons changed, partially because of advances in 
physically smaller “tactical” nuclear weapons—so called because they 
were designed to destroy enemy formations instead of enemy cities, 
despite often having more power than the bombs dropped on Japan 
in 1945. This meant that NATO planners initially intended to use 
nuclear weapons not only if they lost the ground battle but for the 
32  Isabel Campbell, Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951-
1964 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013), 120; Ray Stouffer, 
Swords, Clunks & Widowmakers: The Tumultuous Life of the RCAF’s Original 1 
Canadian Air Division (Trenton: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2015), 
38-68; and Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire: Canada and 
the World to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994), 214-15.
33  MC 3 pledged all members to “insure the ability to deliver the atomic bomb 
promptly,” while MC 14/1, although somewhat coy, clearly meant nuclear weapons 
when it commented on “all offensive and defensive means available.” See both 
Military Committee, “MC 3 – 19.10.1949, The Strategy Concept for the Defence of 
the North Atlantic Area” and Military Committee, “MC 14/1 (Final) – 9.12.1952, 
Strategy Guidance” in NATO Strategy Documents, ed. Gregory W. Pedlow, NATO 
Archives Online, accessed 13 and 15 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/archives/
strategy.htm.
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ground battle itself.34 This shift put Canadian policy makers in a 
bind. Having agreed to participate in an alliance backed by American 
nuclear weapons, Canadian leaders now felt pressure to acquire their 
own nuclear systems.
Concerns about the defence of North America paralleled these 
developments in Europe. Although Canada conducted planning for 
the defence of North America using bilateral agreements outside 
of NATO, the military alliance depended on the effective defence 
of North America and especially the massive nuclear deterrent 
wielded by the bombers of the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF) Strategic 
Air Command (SAC). So although the defence of Europe and the 
defence of North America fell under two separate organisations, 
NATO planning documents linked North American and European 
defence conceptually.35 Canadian and American staffs, who had been 
conducting detailed joint planning for the defence of North America 
since the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940, apprehended the growing 
Soviet bomber threat as early as 1947. After the USSR detonated its 
first nuclear device in 1949, continental defence took on a new urgency. 
As the Soviets fielded increasingly sophisticated technology, staffs 
had to adjust the joint Basic Security Plan (BSP) to keep up with 
these new threats. In 1951, Canada began allowing SAC overflights 
on a case-by-case basis and by 1957 the USAF was operating 
tankers and bombers out of Goose Bay.36 In 1952, work began on 
an ambitious bi-national air defence system that would eventually 
comprise radar lines in Canada’s north, a computerised detection, 
34  MC 48 noted that: “Our studies have indicated that without their immediate 
use we could not successfully defend Europe within the resources available […]
Therefore, in the event of a war involving NATO it is militarily essential that NATO 
forces should be able to use atomic and thermonuclear weapons in their defense 
from the outset.” See “MC 48 (Final) – 22.11.1954, The Most Effective Pattern for 
NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years” in NATO Strategy Documents, 
ed. Pedlow, NATO Archives Online, accessed 13 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/
archives/strategy.htm. For further illustration of NATO’s intention to immediately 
use nuclear weapons in the defence of Europe, see Military Committee, “MC 14/2 
(Rev) (Final Decisions) – 23.5.1957”  and “MC 14/3 (Final) – 16.1.1968” in NATO 
Strategy Documents, ed. Pedlow, NATO Archives Online, accessed 13 April 2019, 
https://www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm. See also Lawrence Freedman, The 
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 
20-27.
35  Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 22-23.
36  Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 13.
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tracking and control system known as SAGE,37 interceptors and SAM 
sites. After lengthy discussions, US and Canadian air defence forces 
were integrated under a single command, North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD), in 1958. 
By 1957, all three services began to ask for a variety of nuclear 
weapons to fulfill these commitments. For continental air defence, 
the RCAF requested nuclear-tipped SAMs as well as nuclear air-to-
air rockets. For 1 CAD, Canada’s aviators argued for a nuclear role 
known as strike/reconnaissance, which would require nuclear gravity 
bombs. The soldiers wanted nuclear-tipped rocket artillery for 4 CIBG 
to keep up with NATO planning that incorporated tactical nuclear 
weapons. The sailors, for their part, sought air-dropped nuclear 
depth bombs and ship-launched nuclear torpedoes. John Diefenbaker, 
elected prime minister in 1957, struggled with this file, unsuccessfully 
trying to wrangle both pro- and anti-nuclear factions in his party. 
Indeed, a definitive account of his nuclear policy is titled Essence of 
Indecision.38 By 1961, Canada had adopted, or had begun to adopt, 
a number of nuclear delivery systems to fill these roles, but without 
the crucial agreement on accepting warheads. At home, the RCAF 
received BOMARC surface-to-air missiles, CF-101 Voodoo aircraft 
capable of delivering MB-1/AIR-2 Genie unguided nuclear rockets. In 
Europe, the Canadian Army received MGR-1 “Honest John” surface-
to-surface rockets for the brigade in Europe and 1 CAD received 
CF-104 Starfighter aircraft configured for, and committed to, the 
nuclear strike/reconnaissance role. Without their “physics packages,” 
however, these systems were basically useless. Although Canada 
would adopt a number of nuclear-capable anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW) systems, it would never conclude an agreement to equip them 
with nuclear warheads (see Table 1).
Diefenbaker’s anti-American leanings and personal dislike 
of American president John F. Kennedy compounded the already 
complicated economic, technical and political issues involved in 
equipping Canadian-owned systems with American warheads. 
Diefenbaker, who worried about American incursion into Canadian 
37  SAGE stood for “Semi-Autonomous Ground Environment” and was an early 
computer network not unlike the modern internet. See Maloney, Learning to Love 
the Bomb, 24.
38  Patricia McMahon, Essence of Indecision: Diefenbaker’s Nuclear Policy 1957-
1963 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009). 
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cultural and political life, saw no reason to spend his political capital 
on nuclear issues and let the matter fester. The talks ground out 
over several years and the interminable confusion provided Lester 
B. Pearson, the leader of the opposition, with the grounds to 
force an election in 1963. Upon gaining office, the Liberals quickly 
ended the drawn-out nuclear negotiations and arranged for joint 
custody and control of the warheads for all systems save ASW. In 
these arrangements, the warheads remained under joint Canadian-
American security arrangements with direct contact to the warheads 
being controlled by American custodial detachments. In times of 
operational necessity, the custodial detachments would release the 
weapons to Canadian crews to mount on Canadian delivery systems. 
Service-to-service agreements and specific doctrine governed the 
operational employment of individual weapons; for example, the release 
of air defence warheads to Canadian aircraft depended on closely 
synchronised NORAD and Canadian air defence alert states, but the 
use of nuclear systems by 1 CAD was governed by specific NATO 
operational plans (see Table 1). Pearson’s Cabinet also authorised 
closer air defence measures, such as allowing the dispersal of nuclear-
armed US interceptors to Canadian airfields during periods of high 
international tension.39 
Although Pearson accepted the warheads, he did so 
unenthusiastically. Accepting the warheads fulfilled a number 
of defence commitments, but many of these commitments, in his 
view, did not best serve Canada’s interests. Thus, while the services 
began implementing the technical agreements made with their US 
counterparts, the government immediately began looking for non-
nuclear roles. By 1972, the Liberal governments of Pearson and, 
after 1968, Pierre Trudeau succeeded in divesting all nuclear systems 
except the AIR-2 Genie.40 This search for new roles in an evolving 
strategic balance would prove to be a major task for Sutherland and 
Lindsey in the decade ahead.
The first of Sutherland’s public articles, “Canada’s Long Term 
Strategic Situation” published in 1962, is a good starting point to 
39  The specific alert level was the NORAD “Defence Condition 3” or DEFCON 3, 
given during a period of “delicate or strained international relations.” See Maloney, 
Learning to Love the Bomb, 194, 345.
40  Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons, 58-59, 84, 92, 178, 232-33, 236-38; and 
Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Warheads, 1945-2009,” 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 65, 4 (July/August 2009): 76.
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Delivery 
System
Weapon / 
Warhead Purpose Yield Release Procedure Divested
BOMARC W40 7-10 kt 1972
CF-101B 
Voodoo
MB1-AIR 2 
Genie / W25 1.5 kt 1984
iii
B 57 gravity 
bomb / W57
5-20 kt 
(variable)
B 43 gravity 
bomb 1 Mt
B 28 1.45 Mt (variable)
US custodial detachments to receive 
authorisation for release from national 
channels.
Once released, launch of individual rockets to 
be controlled at the Corps level – for 4 CIBG, 
this was I (British) Corps.
Mk 101 “Lulu” 
/ W34 10 kt
Mk 105 
“Hotpoint” / 
W34
10 kt
B 57 / W57 5-20 kt (variable)
CP-121 
Tracker 
(RCN)
Mk 101 “Lulu” 
/ W34 10 kt
Mk 101 “Lulu” 
/ W34 10 kt
Mk 105 
“Hotpoint” / 
W34
10 kt
ASROC 
(Ship 
mounted, 
Restigouche 
class)iv
Dual-capable; 
nuclear delivery 
based on Mk.46 
torpedo / W44
5 kt
345-49.
until 1987.
iii Two CF-101s were reconfigured as EF-101Bs and kept on in an electronic warfare capacity without mounting the AIR-2 
iv The ASROC was acquired and mounted on RCN Restigouche-class ships in a conventional role.
Bomb, 313-14, 323-38, 355-57.
permissions were obtained and transmitted. For a detailed technical discussion, see Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb , 
CP-107 
Argus 
(RCAF) / CP-
122 Neptune 
(RCAF)
Anti-
Submarine 
Warfare
Not applicable. Although these platforms were capable of 
carrying American nuclear weapons, no government-to-
government agreement existed for their joint custody and 
release in times of operational necessity.
CH-124 Sea 
King (RCN)
i  John Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons , 58-59, 84, 92, 178, 232-33, 236-38; Sean Maloney, Learning to Love the 
ii There were significant technical differences between the CF-101 AIR-2 Genie and CIM-10 BOMARC in how these 
MGR-1 
Honest John W31
Corps-level 
nuclear 
artillery
2, 20, 40 
kt 
(variable)
1972
Anti-Submarine Warfare – Planned but not acquired
Table 1: Nuclear Weapons in Canadian Arsenalsi
Air Defence
At DEFCON 1, defensive nuclear weapons 
release sought by C-in-C NORAD from 
designated national representatives with pre-
delegation. Individual release controlled by 
sector commanders.ii
CF-104 
Starfighter
Tactical 
nuclear strike
SACEUR receives US national authority to 
release nuclear weapons, transmits release 
authority to US custodial sections. Weapons 
employed as part of pre-designated SACEUR 
plans.
1972
14
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understand the basis of his thinking about Canadian participation in 
nuclear roles during the 1960s. Written as a response to an emerging 
body of advocates for Canadian neutrality, Sutherland made the case 
for continuing a policy of alliance participation.41 In Sutherland’s 
view, regardless of its political alignment, Canada’s strategic situation 
was dominated by political and economic “invariables” and “broad 
national interests.”42 Of these considerations, Canada’s proximity to, 
and economic connectedness with, the United States was paramount. 
This closeness meant that it was basically impossible for Canada to be 
secure without the Americans being secure and vice versa.43 Canadian 
influence depended on how much Ottawa mattered to Washington 
and, to a lesser extent, European capitals. But how best to matter? 
Sutherland tied Western security directly to the maintenance of SAC’s 
nuclear bomber force. If Canada wanted an independent voice, it had 
to meaningfully participate in these important aspects of Western 
defence.44 These hard invariables were complemented by softer 
considerations, such as a cultural affinity for Europe, which inexorably 
involved Ottawa in European security.45 Whether Canadians liked it 
or not, they were subject to an “involuntary guarantee” of security 
commitments from Washington. To maintain its independent voice, 
Canada needed to play “a significant role in Western security” to 
both be “present at the table [where] we can serve our own interests” 
and “maintain real influence in Washington.”46
To understand these issues further, it is necessary to understand 
some of the jargon involved in deterrence theory. In plain English, 
a “first strike” occurs when combatant “A” begins nuclear hostilities 
against combatant “B” in an attempt to destroy B’s ability to 
retaliate. This usually means that the first strike would be directed 
against B’s military forces (a “counter-force” strike). If A fails to 
destroy B’s forces, B might use its remaining nuclear forces in a 
“second strike” to retaliate against A with the objective of making the 
retaliation as painful as possible by targeting cities (a “counter-value” 
41  Matthew P. Trudgen and Joel J. Sokolsky, “The Canadian strategic debate of the 
early 1960s,” International Journal 67, 1 (2011-2012): 184, 187-88.
42  R.J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” International Journal 
17 (1962): 201.
43  Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 203.
44  Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 212-14.
45  Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 205.
46  Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 208.
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strike). It is possible for both sides to have a second strike capability 
and, given the right technical ability and resources, both A and B 
might have secure second-strike capabilities—that is, the ability on 
both sides to sustain a counter-force first strike from an adversary 
and retaliate with a counter-value second strike. When neither side 
has a decisive technological or quantitative edge in defensive or 
offensive capabilities, the situation is balanced; when the nature of 
the cumulative capabilities disincentivises a first strike, it produces 
strategic stability.47 Because Canada did not have an independent 
nuclear capability, it could not have a true nuclear strategy of its 
own. Even so, Ottawa had to plan around the likely actions of powers 
with independent nuclear deterrents, putting Canadian strategists in 
the unenviable position of trying to contribute to strategic stability 
while also having no say in the decision to launch—or not launch—a 
first strike. In this sense, Canadian policy required less of a nuclear 
strategy than a strategy involving nuclear weapons.
The state of technological development in the early 1960s required 
consistent investment in new technologies to encourage strategic 
stability. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, introduced in the late 
1950s, showed promise in replacing the bomber as the ideal weapon for 
an attacker due to their speed and invulnerability to conventional air 
defences. Yet early ICBMs were limited in number and too inaccurate 
to ensure an effective first strike. By virtue of being liquid-fuelled, 
ICBMs were slow and vulnerable themselves, which made them a 
poor second-strike option. Denying Soviet bombers, which were more 
accurate and carried larger loads, access to SAC targets remained 
vital for the Americans to conduct an effective second strike.48 Still, 
the trend was for ICBMs to replace the bomber as the primary means 
of delivery. Once that happened, a water-tight defence against nuclear 
strike would become impossible, requiring a new way of thinking 
about nuclear weapons.
“Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation” encapsulated many 
key concepts that drove Sutherland’s and Lindsey’s thinking. First 
was the unity of security. Security was tied to Canadian national 
47  Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold 
War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2012), 37-40. Delpech 
challenges the idea that “strategic stability” is a useful term as the US, Russia and 
China have yet to agree on a precise definition. This being said, the way in which the 
term will be used in this paper is from a Western point of view. 
48  Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 212-14.
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interests. Although NATO was not connected to NORAD formally, 
it was connected conceptually. Second was the security-resource 
calculation. Canada needed to recognise that it had limited resources 
and should conduct an unemotional calculation of how those resources 
could be devoted to achieving maximum security and sovereignty. 
There were no sacred commitments or capabilities. Finally, there 
was the need for strategic-technical flexibility. Canada could not 
influence larger strategic and technological trends, but it had to 
respond to them.
strategic changes in the early sixties: a lecture, a 
report, and a white paper 
Sutherland further developed these ideas in a 1963 lecture at the 
National Defence College. With regard to weapons, Sutherland 
concluded that “[t]he important point, it seems to me, is that there 
isn’t anything new or exciting.”49 Both the Americans and the 
Soviets were well on their way to developing secure second-strike 
deterrents and this was unlikely to change. On the other hand, as big 
wars became unthinkable, small wars become more likely, making 
conventional forces more important. During the 1950s, US President 
Dwight Eisenhower’s administration adopted a doctrine of “massive 
retaliation,” whereby the US would leverage its superior capacity to 
produce nuclear weapons as a way of saving on defence. Because the 
Americans could build so many nuclear weapons, the thinking went, 
it would be impossible for the Soviets to destroy all of them in a first 
strike. This gave Washington the freedom to cut back on expensive 
conventional forces by credibly threatening any Soviet attack on the 
West with an overwhelming nuclear response.50 Robert McNamara, 
Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, had long criticised this doctrine on 
the grounds that US reliance on nuclear weapons lacked credibility 
because of its disproportionality. If Moscow sponsored a group of 
fanatical East German communists to conduct a series of cross-
border raids on West German military targets, could Washington 
really be expected to respond with a nuclear strike? Without 
sufficient conventional forces, the Americans could not counter 
49  Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 212-14. 
50  Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 72-74.
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Soviet provocations below the threshold of an all-out attack on the 
West. Paradoxically, without the ability to realistically respond 
to such provocations, the US would lose further credibility. The 
Kennedy administration obligingly boosted US defence spending, 
but mainly on non-nuclear capabilities as part of a new doctrine 
of “flexible response” that would give American policy leaders the 
widest possible range of options in a crisis.51 Sutherland praised this 
new way of thinking which put the Americans at “the cutting edge of 
diplomacy.”52 From a Canadian perspective, however, he also warned 
that these capabilities were meant to bolster “US national interests 
and US power to maintain these interests.”53 In other words, with 
greater flexibility, the US would depend less on its allies, limiting 
their influence. These new limits had been all too apparent in Cuba.
Canadian prime ministers from both major political parties had 
shown a willingness to spend considerable sums on defence to gain a 
place at the table in Washington. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
Kennedy had shown little desire to take a seat himself. The exact 
chronology of the crisis will not be covered here, but it is important 
to review a few of the key events. By the autumn of 1962, the 
Canadian political debate surrounding the acceptance of nuclear 
warheads had stalled. The Tories came out of the June election 
with a shaky minority and little political incentive to push for a 
major policy decision before an expected vote of no confidence.54 
The only major push came from Howard Green, Diefenbaker’s 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, who sought a third way on 
the question of warheads. His plan was to maintain the BOMARC 
SAM systems and CF-101 Voodoo interceptors that Canada had 
already paid for, but to keep the warheads in the US on standby 
51  Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 218.
52  Sutherland, “Trends in Strategic Weapons and Concepts – Lecture to the National 
Defence College by R.J. Sutherland,” 11 March 1963, III.72, vol. 1, 87/253, Lindsey-
Sutherland fonds, DHH; and William Rosenau, “The Kennedy Administration, US 
Foreign Internal Security Assistance, and the Challenge of ‘Subterranean War,’ 1961-
63,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 14, 3 (Autumn 2003): 72-73.
53  Sutherland, “Trends in Strategic Weapons and Concepts – Lecture to the National 
Defence College by R.J. Sutherland,” 11 March 1963, III.72, vol. 1, 87/253, Lindsey-
Sutherland fonds, DHH.
54  McMahon, Essence of Indecision, 146.
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should they be needed in the event of an “emergency.”55 The RCAF 
and USAF opposed the plan on technical grounds, as transporting 
the warheads would require a large fleet of specialised aircraft. 
Moreover, claiming nuclear innocence while planning to fly in 
warheads to use on Canadian systems in a crisis would fool no one 
while simultaneously making the response slower. If Canada wanted 
its cake, it would have to eat it too.
Nuclear weapons and continental defence quickly became less 
than academic questions. Between 15 and 16 October 1962, US 
surveillance aircraft found Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 Intermediate-
Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in Cuba. These missiles greatly 
worried the Americans because the IRBMs could potentially deliver 
an accurate first strike on SAC with almost no warning and no way 
to stop them. Kennedy and his administration began looking at 
options on 16 October and Canada was warned through intelligence 
channels on 20 October about the brewing crisis. It was not until 22 
October that Kennedy consulted with Diefenbaker on the political 
level. Feeling snubbed, Diefenbaker undercut the Americans when he 
publicly proposed UN inspections of Cuban disarmament. The Prime 
Minister also dragged his feet for two days before issuing specific alert 
conditions to Canadian air and naval forces dedicated to NORAD 
and BSP commitments.56 An embarrassed defence minister, Douglas 
Harkness, quietly ordered the RCAF and RCN to take alert-like 
measures without going on alert themselves.57 By the time the formal 
alert order was issued on 25 October, it had “a hollow ring to many 
US officials.”58 However careful pre-crisis operational planning may 
have been, it could not bypass unresolved aspects of national strategy 
in Diefenbaker’s cabinet. Even basic military problems persisted. The 
RCN and RCAF did not have an effective joint headquarters during 
the crisis, meaning that it was difficult to coordinate a Canadian 
55  This idea started as a potential stopgap measure by the RCAF in the event that 
a crisis occurred before negotiations could be completed. Green and Diefenbaker 
latched onto it as a way out of difficult negotiations and went as far as announcing 
the measure in the House before talking it over with the Americans. See Maloney, 
Learning to Love the Bomb, 262.
56  For a good description of alert statuses, see Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 
187-96. 
57  Peter Haydon, “The Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years Later,” Canadian Naval Review 
8, 3 (Fall 2012): 12. See also Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy: The First Century, 2nd 
ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 234-35. 
58  McMahon, Essence of Indecision, 150.
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response to the threat without involving US command linkages.59 
Defence planning had seemed almost intentionally blind to the close 
relationship between war and politics. If Canada had bought all kinds 
of expensive systems to gain the right of consultation in a crisis, then 
the investment seemed a bad one. 
Sutherland did not speak to a great extent on the crisis itself, 
but his commentary on the changed strategic situation which 
followed it marked a new direction in his thinking on the relation 
of nuclear weapons to Canada’s national interests. He noted that 
“when the period of extreme tension had passed—there was a strong 
reaction. This is true of France, Britain, Pakistan, certain of the 
South American countries and Canada.”60 He also touched on the 
issue of consultation. “Many Europeans,” he noted, “were no less 
impressed by the fact that the USA acted without consultation with 
its European allies, and that if the Cuban incident had led to all-
out war Western Europe would have participated in the disaster.”61 
When it came to questions of splitting atoms and splitting cities, 
Washington would do what was best in a narrow conception of its 
own self-interest. After being elected with a minority government in 
April 1963, Pearson attempted to chart a new way forward. Having 
used the issue of nuclear weapons as a means to pound the Tories 
both in the House and during the election, his government quickly 
agreed to accept warheads for air defence and NATO commitments 
to Europe, with a long-term goal of finding non-nuclear roles. It 
was with this in mind that Pearson “initiated a searching review 
of defence programmes and activities.”62 Paul Hellyer, Pearson’s 
defence minister from 1963 to 1967, did not trust normal channels to 
undertake sufficiently creative thinking on defence policy. Instead, he 
named two ad-hoc committees: the Ad Hoc Committee on a Mobile 
Force, chaired by Brigadier H.Q. Love, and the Ad Hoc Committee 
59  Peter C. Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement 
Reconsidered (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), 219-21.
60  Sutherland, “Trends in Strategic Weapons and Concepts – Lecture to the National 
Defence College by R.J. Sutherland,” 11 March 1963, III.72, vol. 1, 87/253, Lindsey-
Sutherland fonds, DHH.
61  Sutherland, “Trends in Strategic Weapons and Concepts – Lecture to the National 
Defence College by R.J. Sutherland,” 11 March 1963, III.72, vol. 1, 87/253, Lindsey-
Sutherland fonds, DHH.
62  Lucien Cardin, “Address by the Hon Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of 
National Defence, to the National Defence College,” July 1963, 5.7, vol. 1, 87/253, 
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
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on Defence Policy, chaired by Sutherland. While Love’s committee 
looked at the specifics of equipping a globally deployable force, 
Sutherland’s committee examined Canada’s defence policy more 
broadly. Sutherland is described by historian Peter Kasurak as the 
“only star” on the committee and its final report came to be known 
as the Sutherland Report.63 
The report injected a dry realism about Canada’s power into 
policy circles, driving a look at security-resource allocations in an 
unsentimental way. Sutherland attributed Canada’s outsized post-
war influence to two unique circumstances—namely, the destruction 
of much of Europe’s industrial plants during the Second World War 
and a booming post-war economy that powered high defence spending 
during the 1950s. These conditions no longer existed. Canada simply 
could not afford to maintain its current defence commitments 
without a significant increase in defence spending to offset climbing 
real costs.64 Moreover, the growth of European economies meant that 
Canada’s relative power was in decline. With this in mind, a strict 
triage, which reflected the unity of security, was in order. The top 
priority was the defence of North America, then that of the “North 
Atlantic Community” (i.e. NATO), then “the rest of the world” (UN 
and perhaps Commonwealth commitments).65 As George Lindsey 
later noted, this change in the strategic situation moved DRAE away 
from a technical focus and further towards “a new type of defence 
research, involving strategic and social studies.”66 A wider view would 
focus less on the absolute effectiveness of individual systems and more 
on the relative benefit of maintaining one capability over another.
The Sutherland Report reflected this change in thinking. Canada 
did not possess an independent nuclear deterrent and had no desire 
to build one. By not doing so, Canada abandoned any ability to 
realistically remain neutral in a world conflict. Its geographic 
proximity to, and close economic integration with, the US meant 
that “Canada’s interests are identified with those of the United States 
63  Kasurak, A National Force, 77; and “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence 
Policy,” 30 September 1963, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
64  Kasurak, A National Force, 12-13, 29-30, 75-76. 
65  “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 11, 
III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
66  George R. Lindsey, “The Contribution of Operational Research to National 
Defence (1979),” in Wiseman, The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey, 30.
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beyond any possibility of disentanglement.”67 This also meant that 
the nation relied on two nuclear-enabled alliances to guarantee its 
security: NATO, which used nuclear weapons in its doctrine and 
planning, and NORAD, which was designed to protect the nuclear 
deterrent provided by SAC. Canada, in the report’s words, “cannot be 
a member of a military alliance and at the same avoid responsibility 
for the strategic policies which give it reality.”68 If a major war came, 
Canada would be involved; its use of American warheads was largely 
a technical one. This cool appreciation of technical impacts on the 
options open to Canadian decision makers challenges Simpson’s 
assertion that the “defenders” advocating for continued participation 
in the nuclear aspects of Western alignment worked off a combination 
of Second World War sentimentality, fear of diplomatic censure 
and “deep-seated loyalty to the United States.”69 Though personal 
experience certainly played a part, the pro-nuclear camp had a strong 
technical rationale based on reasonable assumptions about Canada’s 
place in the international order. Then again, Canada’s participation 
in these alliances was a political decision that inevitably brought 
wider political factors into the decision-making process in the first 
place. As the political and the technical imperatives pulled further 
apart, decisions would become harder and harder to make. 
Decisions about air defence systems were the easiest to make 
because they were the most technical in nature. Although ICBMs 
were set to replace manned bombers as the principal means of nuclear 
weapons delivery in the coming decade, bombers still provided 
greater accuracy and lower cost per megaton to deliver, meaning 
that the ability to defend against them constituted an important 
part of preserving SAC’s retaliatory capability. If those defensive 
systems used nuclear warheads, so be it. As the Soviets continued 
to invest less in bombers than in missiles, the utility of an absolute 
defence against an assault from aircraft diminished, especially given 
the enormous cost of maintaining multiple lines of radar stations and 
SAM batteries. Eventually, warning would come to mean a lot more 
than a strict defence and that warning could eventually be provided 
67  “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 56, 
III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
68  “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 37, 
III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
69  Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, 184-89.
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at far lower a cost through the use of new radar technologies.70 In a 
morbid pro and con, nuclear devastation was now unavoidable in the 
event of general war but, short of the apocalypse, increasingly scarce 
cash could be freed for other uses.
Canada’s nuclear role in NATO proved to be the most politically 
complex issue. Ottawa had deployed a brigade and an air division 
to Europe permanently in 1951, before NATO’s embrace of tactical 
nuclear weapons. By 1955, NATO planners began reorienting 
towards a heavy reliance on tactical nuclear weapons and in 1958 
the Military Committee approved new force goals in a document 
known as MC 70 to reflect this new reality. MC 70 put Canadian 
policy makers in a bind: they had committed a conventional 
brigade and air division in 1951 with no expectation of nuclear 
entanglements; now they were being asked to take on substantial 
nuclear roles in the form of a battery of tactical nuclear rockets 
for Canada’s NATO brigade and to take on the nuclear “strike/
reconnaissance” role for 1 CAD.71 Cabinet duly ordered the CF-
104 Starfighter for 1 CAD in 1959 and MGR-1 Honest Johns for 
4 CIBG in 1960.72 Because of the Diefenbaker government’s fence-
sitting, by the time the platforms were equipped with warheads in 
1963-4, the Americans were pushing for more conventional forces to 
allow for a new doctrine of flexible response designed to slow nuclear 
escalation. Technologically, the new rage was precision conventional 
weapons and Canada had failed to keep pace.73
4 CIBG had finally become nuclear-capable, but the delay irritated 
the Americans and limited their political payoff. Domestically, 
the weapons became operational just as their popularity with the 
70  “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 82-83, 
III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
71  Campbell, Unlikely Diplomats, 156-58, 166-67. Technically, it was one-third of a 
division, which can be translated a brigade. For aircraft, Canada was expected to 
maintain one squadron of twenty-five aircraft for LB/FB (Light Bomber/Fighter 
Bomber) strike and one squadron of LB/FB attack in 1958, with LB/FB attack 
growing to three squadrons by 1961. See Military Committee, “MC 70 – The 
Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958-1963,” 29 January 1958, 248, 274, 
NATO Archives Online, accessed 30 May 2020, http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/
null/1/0/105221/MC_0070_ENG_PDP.pdf; and Maloney, Learning to Love the 
Bomb, 164.
72  Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 151, 160.
73  “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 14-15, 
29-33, 35, 61, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
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Canadian public waned and their military utility declined.74 Although 
Canadian troops remained an important political commitment to the 
Europeans, the security-resource payoff of an expensive, nuclear-
armed mechanised brigade was weakening. Sutherland’s committee 
recommended a re-evaluation of Canada’s ground commitment and 
looked at a number of alternatives. The options included committing 
troops to European defence but basing them in Canada;75 creating a 
self-projecting “triphibious” force of roughly a brigade group strength 
to respond to crises on NATO’s flanks;76 re-negotiating Canadian 
commitment to SACEUR from a standard brigade to air-transportable 
reinforcements;77 and finally, transforming the large central front 
commitment into a prospective NATO mobile force co-located with 
Canadian air assets.78 One option, the relocation of the brigade to a 
less prominent position near Canadian airfields in southern Germany, 
would have given a stronger national character to the commitment 
and involved a reduction in size—not to mention a non-nuclear role. 
74  Public support for nuclear weapons dropped considerably during the 1960s. In 
1963, 58% of respondents agreed that Canadian forces should be nuclear armed; 
by 1968, that number fell to 41.7%. Gallup Canada Inc., “Dataset: Canadian 
Gallup Poll, March 1963, #301,” <odesi> Database, accessed 12 April 2019, 
http://odesi2.scholarsportal.info/webview/index.jsp?object=http://142.150.1
90.128:80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2Fcipo-301-E-1963-03&mode=documentation&
v=2&top=yes; Gallup Canada Inc., “Dataset: Canadian Gallup Poll, June 1966, 
#319,” <odesi> Database, accessed 12 April 2019, http://odesi2.scholarsportal.
info/webview/index.jsp?object=http://142.150.190.128:80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%
2Fcipo-319-E-1966-06&mode=documentation&v=2&top=yes. Notably, a 1968 
poll still showed a strong majority (71.3%) of respondents supported Canadian 
troops remaining in Europe. See Gallup Canada Inc., “Dataset: Canadian 
Gallup Poll, October 1968, #332,” <odesi> Database, accessed 12 April 2019, 
http://odesi2.scholarsportal.info/webview/index.jsp?object=http://142.150.190.128
:80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2Fcipo-332-E-1968-08&mode=documentation&v=2&top=y
es; and “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 
33, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
75  “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 17-20, 
III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
76  “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 120-
27, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
77  “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 127-
30, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
78  ”Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 150-
52, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
24
Canadian Military History, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 16
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss1/16
  25K E E S S 
Strikingly, this option was roughly analogous in many ways to the 
downsizing of the brigade from 1969 to 1972.79 
The report noted a number of technical issues with the strike/
reconnaissance role. For one, the committee estimated that the 
CF-104 would likely approach the end of its service life somewhere 
between 1969 and 1972 with an absolute end date of no later than 
1975 (in the end, they flew until 1987).80 Moreover, the advent of a 
Soviet second strike deterrent made the chances of a NATO first 
strike extremely low as there was no logical way that NATO could 
employ nuclear weapons against the Soviets without facing nuclear 
devastation themselves. The Starfighters, then, were likely vulnerable 
to either an early nuclear strike or increasingly effective enemy air 
defences if they survived the wave of Soviet attacks. Surface-to-
surface missiles would be a cheaper and more survivable option if 
Canada wanted to continue in a nuclear delivery role.81 Thus, it made 
sense to switch 1 CAD to a “general tactical air support” platform, 
ideally the F-4 Phantom II sometime in 1969, with an intermediate 
period of using the CF-104s in a conventional role.82 
The careful weighing of options in the report paved the way for 
the 1964 White Paper on Defence. NATO commitments remained 
largely the same, but the document indicated that change was 
desirable. The white paper lifted its passages on nuclear commitments 
almost verbatim from the Sutherland Report, concluding that “[h]
aving accepted the responsibility for membership in a nuclear-armed 
79  It is unlikely that Sutherland had cuts in mind that went as deep as Trudeau’s 
did: halving of the force to 2,800 troops. The mobile force would have also likely been 
air transportable, as opposed to merely the watered-down version of the mechanised 
force that remained after the Trudeau cuts. See J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: 
Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 
363-64.
80  Sutherland, “Trends in Strategic Weapons and Concepts – Lecture to the National 
Defence College by R.J. Sutherland,” 11 March 1963, III.72, vol. 1, 87/253, Lindsey-
Sutherland fonds, DHH. The CF-18 was selected as a replacement in 1984 for the 
CF-101, CF-5 and CF-104 but took time to phase in. By the end of its service life, 
the CF-104 had had an extremely high mishap rate of 18.5 incidents per 100 flight 
hours (in contrast, the CF-18 had a predicted rate of 5.6 and an actual rate in the 
first ten years of usage of 7.14). See Richard Shimooka, “Training at the Edge: The 
Canadian Air Force’s Transition to the CF-18, and Lessons Learned for Canada’s 
Next Generation Fighter,” Canadian Military Journal 15, 4 (Autumn 2015): 31.
81  “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 97, 
III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
82  “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 99-
100, 119, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
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alliance, the question of nuclear weapons for the Canadian armed 
forces is a subordinate issue. It depends how we can most effectively 
contribute to collective strength.”83 Understood in this context, air 
defence was framed in terms of the less important role of the bomber: 
while still vital, its value would “gradually decline” over the course 
of the decade as the ICBM threat grew and the likelihood of a cost-
effective defence against ICBMs remained low.84 
The discussion of Canadian nuclear delivery systems allocated to 
NATO commitments was less technical and more political. Although 
the new policy kept NATO commitments, it framed them in political, 
not military, terms:
[the brigade’s] presence, moreover, has a political significance for the 
Alliance, and its withdrawal from front-line positions at this time could 
be misinterpreted – by both our European allies and the Soviet bloc. 
The importance to the Alliance’s solidarity of Canadian ‘presence’ in 
the NATO defence forces is real […] chang[e] [should happen] gradually, 
in conformity to a relatively long term plan of action.85
In contrast to the public white paper, the classified Sutherland 
Report had advocated for long-term doctrinal development to pave 
the way towards lighter, more mobile and crucially non-nuclear forces 
as an effective contribution to NATO’s strength, allowing Ottawa’s 
contribution to “accor[d] with Canada’s geographic location and 
other Canadian defence interests.”86 
The white paper contained no such ambiguity about the air division. 
Canada would phase out the strike/reconnaissance role, allow the 
CF-104 squadrons to attrite and look for a “high performance aircraft 
[…] to provide sufficient flexibility for any task we might undertake 
from ground attack to air surveillance.”87 The Sutherland Report 
noted that a Canadian air presence in Europe, especially in terms of 
infrastructure, would be required to allow for rapid reinforcement of 
fighter squadrons from aircraft based in Canada. Because the RCAF 
83  Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Queen’s 
Printer, 1964), 13.
84  Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence (1964), 14.
85  Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence (1964), 21.
86  “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 160-
61, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
87  Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence (1964), 22.
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operated separate specialised fleets—the CF-101 in Canada and CF-
104 in Europe—Ottawa could not reinforce Europe smoothly in the 
event of a regional crisis. It therefore made sense to move towards a 
multi-role aircraft, which made the specialised CF-104 impracticable. 
The white paper, by emphasising flexibility provided by a single fleet, 
reflected the Sutherland Report’s emphasis on framing commitments 
with the unity of security in mind. Sean Maloney argues that the 
CF-104 continued to have military relevance vis-à-vis missiles 
despite the criticisms of contemporary observers and that phasing 
out strike/reconnaissance was misguided for both technical and 
operational reasons.88 On a tactical level, Maloney is correct, but 
misses Sutherland’s larger point: strike/reconnaissance was not a wise 
use of diminishing military resources in a Canadian national context. 
The report further emphasised the Canadian perspective when it 
recommended that the air division “be associated […] more directly 
with the army brigade group in Europe.”89 
Despite the innovative thinking in the Sutherland Report and 
the political weight of a fresh white paper, the years between 1964 
and 1968 saw no significant movement on the nuclear weapons 
question. 4 CIBG retained its role as a heavy mechanised formation 
backed by Honest Johns. A weak policy process turned the CF-104 
replacement into a fiasco, with the RCAF receiving the nearly useless 
CF-5 in 1968—an aircraft so underwhelming that it never managed 
to replace the Starfighter, which stayed in Canadian inventory until 
it was replaced by the CF-18 in the 1980s.90 “Vested interests in 
the Department,” Sutherland lamented in 1964, seemed to inject 
an insurmountable inertia to a real, rational reform of dispersed 
commitments.91 With the government focussed on a range of other 
issues, from healthcare to a new flag, departmental resistance and 
the military issues associated with implementing unification, it was 
88  Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 25-26.
89  Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence (1964), 22-23.
90  R.J. Sutherland, “Budgeting and programming as tools of defence management,” 
21 October 1963, 1-5, III.7, vol. 5, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH; Program 
Study Group, “Planning Programming, Budgeting in the Department of National 
Defence,” November 1966, III.55, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH; 
Ray Stouffer, “Cold War Air Power Choices for the RCAF: Paul Hellyer and the 
Selection of the CF-5 Freedom Fighter,” Canadian Military Journal  7, 3 (Fall 2006): 
64-65;and Stouffer, Swords, Clunks and Widowmakers, 111-12, 145.
91  R.J. Sutherland to VCDS [Vice Chief of the Defence Staff] (presumed), untitled 
memo, 20 February 1964, III.16, vol. 5, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
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unlikely that any sane politician would force a review of perennially 
difficult nuclear questions. As Sutherland put to the Vice Chief of the 
Defence Staff in 1966:
There are certain questions answers to which would greatly simplify 
our problems. These include the future of our forces in Europe, whether 
or not we are going to continue to the NORAD agreement, and the 
precise nature of the commitment with respect to peace-keeping and 
strategically mobile forces. But the fact is that no Government in its 
right mind is going to commit itself on these questions [emphasis 
added].92 
trudeau, the defence review and a new white paper
Although Sutherland was a key part of DRAE, he was not the 
entirety of the organisation. This became painfully clear after he 
died at work during one of his 15-hour workdays on 4 January 1967 
at the age of forty-five.93 George Lindsey replaced him later that 
month.94 Sutherland departed at an inopportune time as Pierre 
Trudeau joined the Cabinet as Minister of Justice three months 
later. Over the next year, the new minister developed an inner 
circle of policy advisors who quickly progressed from constitutional 
questions into those of defence and foreign policy, often with radical 
conclusions. Trudeau became the leader of the Liberal Party in April 
1968, followed the next year by an election where he gained the 
first majority government since 1962. Diefenbaker and Pearson had 
annoyed planners with their hedging, but Trudeau would frighten 
them with his resolve.
Over the next three years, Trudeau demanded a return to first 
principles in defence policy and proved to be remarkably malleable 
in his views when a clearly argued rationale for a particular policy 
could be made. One issue where this malleability showed itself was 
NATO membership. There is some dispute as to just how much 
92  R.J. Sutherland to VCDS, “Memorandum – Program Analysis,” 14 September 
1965, III.16, vol. 5, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
93  Lee and Bellamy, “Dr. R.J. Sutherland: A Retrospective,” n.d., 3, III.0, vol. 5, 
87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
94  DRB, “Announcement by Defence Research Board,” 24 January 1967, II.4, vol. 1, 
87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
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of a NATO-sceptic Trudeau had been upon assuming power, but 
there was no denying that he was, at some point, less than friendly 
towards Canadian troops in Europe. This was especially true of 
his foreign policy advisor, Ivan Head.95 Nonetheless, by the end of 
the review process, Canada remained in NATO and the Canadian 
troop commitment to Europe, although reduced, remained as well. 
On the one hand, Trudeau was constrained by his ministers. Early 
in the process, when he tabled a paper to Cabinet that proposed 
slashing the armed forces defence minister Léo Cadieux, cowed him 
by threatening to resign on the spot.96 On the other hand, the new 
prime minister seemed genuinely interested in being convinced one 
way or another. He often described Cabinet meetings as university-
style “seminars,” injecting contrarian positions into the mix when he 
felt that representatives from the ministries of defence or external 
affairs were unwilling to do so, moving the discussion along until a 
consensus was reached.97 When given a solid rationale, he changed 
his mind, at least in degree if not direction. Donald MacDonald, who 
took over as defence minister in September 1970, had argued heavily 
against any NATO commitment during the reviews—a position that 
would have seemed natural and logical to the Trudeau of 1968. Not 
long after, he found the Prime Minister “scandalisé” by his views.98  
Such an emphasis on a coherent ends-means justification would 
have been music to Sutherland’s ears and proved to be a challenge 
for George Lindsey’s able mind. From the election in the summer 
of 1968 until the first major defence policy announcement in the 
spring of 1969, the first battle in a long confrontation between the 
95  Head would describe Trudeau as “not a hawk” on NATO, especially after a 
1969 trip to see the “old guard” in Europe. He did confirm, however, that Trudeau 
was hostile to the nuclear strike role. Donald MacDonald held that Trudeau “did 
not share [MacDonald’s strong anti-NATO views] very strenuously.” Paul Hellyer 
was convinced that Trudeau was committed to pulling Canadian troops out of 
Europe in 1968, if not pulling out of the alliance altogether. He recollected that 
Trudeau told him that “if he had his heart’s desire, he would pull the troops out.” 
See Ivan Head, interviewed by Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, 6 August 
1987, Accession 20150335, George Metcalf Archival Collection, MHRC; Donald 
MacDonald, interviewed by Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, 5 April 1988, 
Accession 20150335, George Metcalf Archival Collection, MHRC; and Paul Hellyer, 
interviewed by Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, 6 November 1987, Accession 
20150335, George Metcalf Archival Collection, MHRC.
96  Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 4.
97  Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 11-21.
98  Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 15-16, 24-29.
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pro-alignment faction— which included most of DND and DEA—
and a neutralist faction—primarily a group of select ministers and 
advisers close to Trudeau—raged on over the issues of NORAD 
and NATO membership. While Mitchell Sharp, Trudeau’s first 
foreign minister, ordered an interdepartmental Special Task Force 
on Europe (STAFEUR) to produce a review of Canadian policy 
towards NATO, DND began a military-focussed defence policy review 
(DPR).99 These processes produced a series of letter-denominated 
“options” composed of non-aligned choices (A through D), aligned 
options (E through G) and add-ons (H and I) to support the UN and 
possibly even missions with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO), the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the 
Commonwealth (see Table 2). This kind of options-based analysis 
was perfectly suited for the DRB, and DRAE more specifically, and 
the Board’s support came in many forms. Lindsey’s direct advice 
to Cabinet dealt with specific technical and theoretical issues; for 
example, he briefed the Cabinet on air defence in September 1968, 
helping to shape early thinking on the subject. Often, the language 
used in these briefings was directly reflected in public policy 
statements.100 The DRB also received drafts of the policy review 
from the Deputy Minister for technical advice on everything from 
strategic mobility to force composition. Notably, DPR discussions 
included nuclear weapons, but never as an isolated subject.101
Trudeau’s hopes to get the defence review done by November 
1968 proved to be too ambitious. For one, conducting a defence review 
without conducting a general foreign policy review was impracticable; 
STAFEUR had a limited scope and would not be completed until 
February 1969.102 The DPR came out the same month, setting the 
stage for the first major battle: a dramatic series of Cabinet meetings 
that began on 29 March that pitted pro-NATO and anti-NATO 
factions against each other, with salvoes of papers, counter-papers 
99  Earlier reviews were completed but considered inadequate. See Granatstein and 
Bothwell, Pirouette, 3-39. 
100  J.S. Nutt to Basil Robinson, “OPMA SITREP,” 12 September 1968, 40.1968(3), 
vol. 3173, RG 25, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).
101  G.R. Lindsey to Section Heads, DRAES 220-1 (C/DRAE), “Analytical 
Contribution to Defence Policy Review,” 3 February 1969, II.12.2, vol. 2, 87/253, 
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
102  STAFEUR, “Canada and Europe: Report of the Special Task Force on Europe,” 
February 1969, 36.1969.2, vol. 3171, RG 25, LAC; and C.J. Marhsall to Nutt, “Memo: 
Defence Policy Review,” 11 September 1968, 2.16, vol. B41-1, MG 31, LAC.
30
Canadian Military History, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 16
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss1/16
  31K E E S S 
and bitter confrontations. The battle climaxed with a provisional 
statement to the media on Canadian defence policy that the Prime 
Minister planned to announce ahead of NATO meetings in May.103
The DPR was a discussion paper, not an executive document. All 
the same, the degree to which it was permeated by Sutherland’s and 
Lindsey’s ideas and the lengths to which its language was replicated 
in subsequent policy statements highlights just how important 
DRAE’s analysis was in shaping decisions about denuclearisation. 
In terms of nuclear weapons generally, the DPR noted that the 
103  Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 21-25; and P.E. Trudeau, “A defence policy 
for Canada: Statement to the press on April 3 1969,” 3 April 1969, 20.7, vol. 4, 
87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
NATO NORAD UN
A “Light” Non-alignment No No No Internal security only
B
“Medium” 
Non-
alignment
No No No Surveillance and control of territory; able to counter “minor” incursions
C “Heavy” Non-Alignment No No No Defence against external attack
D
Participatory 
Non-
Alignment
No No Participation in peacekeeping
Defence against external attack, capable of 
projection of peacekeeping ops
E
Bilateral 
alignment 
with US
Probably
Maybe 
(primarily to 
maintain 
contact with 
US)
Not defined Not well defined, but focussed on North America
F
Active NATO 
/ Passive 
NORAD
Yes – force 
levels not 
defined
Yes – 
“passive” 
only
Not defined Internal security, surveillance and control of territory. NATO focus
G
Active NATO 
/ Active 
NORAD
Yes – force 
levels not 
defined
Yes – force 
levels not 
defined
Not defined
Internal security, surveillance, control, 
“meaningful” contribution to both 
European and North American defence
H Peacekeeping add-on N/A N/A Yes
Additional peacekeeping capability to be 
added on to options E-G
I
Asia / 
Caribbean add-
on
N/A N/A N/A
Able to contribute to SEATO, ops in 
Caribbean, OAS or  ANZUS (the 
Australia-New Zealand-US defence pact)
Table 2: DPR Optionsv
v Marcel Cadieux to Mitchell Sharp, “Memorandum for the Minister – The Defence Policy Review,” 28 November 1968, 
vol. 3173, RG 25, Library and Archives Canada.
CommitmentOption Name Role of Armed Forces
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advent of plentiful, reliable ICBMs in hardened launch sites and 
a new generation of Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles in the 
mid-1960s had “brought about a radical alteration of the strategic 
situation.”104 This new environment made winning a nuclear war 
virtually impossible. Instead of preparing for a conflict, nuclear 
powers now increasingly sought a mix of capabilities that ensured 
strategic stability. Moreover, this balance had a strong economic 
component: “should B’s countermeasure cost him five times as much 
as A’s measure, B will be penalised in his opportunity to use the 
resources for other purposes in his defence program.”105 Military 
effectiveness on its own was no longer a guarantee of safety and 
attempts to achieve it would be counterproductive if they merely led 
to bankruptcy. 
The section of the DPR on air defence reflected much of Lindsey’s 
and Sutherland’s evolving thinking on the subject. Because the goal 
became the maintenance of strategic stability, the central aim of air 
defence became to disincentivise the Soviets from building a new 
generation of bombers. To do that, North American air defence forces 
had to prevent the Soviets from using their current bombers, or 
any aircraft that the Soviets might develop in the near future, from 
delivering a first strike on American nuclear forces. Previously, a new 
generation of Soviet bombers meant that the US and Canada had 
to invest large sums in updating interceptor fleets. By emphasising 
detection, Canada could invest in new airborne radar technologies 
that would detect almost any foreseeable class of aircraft without 
having to upgrade interceptor fleets. By having just enough in terms 
of hard air defence to prevent a massive, undetected first strike, the 
Canadian military could secure Canadian airspace without stressing 
its economy. It naturally followed that the DPR recommended phasing 
out nuclear weapons for air defence as better detection technologies 
were phased in.106 Though the defence review was collectively authored, 
the origin of this analysis can be inferred by a presentation given to 
the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and 
Defence  by Lindsey in May 1969 where he listed the benefits of this 
104  “Defence Policy Review,” February 1969, 11, 8.13, vol. 2, 87/253, Lindsey-
Sutherland fonds, DHH.
105  “Defence Policy Review,” February 1969, 12-13, 8.13, vol. 2, 87/253, Lindsey-
Sutherland fonds, DHH.
106  “Defence Policy Review,” February 1969, 13-15, 85, 8.13, vol. 2, 87/253, Lindsey-
Sutherland fonds, DHH. See also Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 25.
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technology, with both documents warning against action that might 
encourage the Soviets to build “a new generation of bombers.”107
The inclusion of both technical and economic factors into 
the discussion of Canada’s European commitments had a strong 
resemblance to previous DRAE studies. In the short term, the review 
noted that continuing the strike/reconnaissance role would be the 
cheapest. However, since the CF-104 was expected to be obsolete by 
1978, it made sense at that point to find a new role for Canadian 
aviators in Europe, such as air defence, air superiority or air 
transport.108 As we have seen, these questions were nothing new. As 
for ground commitment, the document mostly rehashed discussions in 
the Sutherland Report: it compared the benefits of air-transportable 
versus mechanised forces, as well as the possibilities and problems 
with relocating to a base “west of the Rhine.”109 Importantly, it noted 
that 4 CIBG would have to either be re-equipped to properly fulfill 
its Central Front role or find a new role between 1974 and 1978. The 
brigade’s Centurion tanks were starting to look very dated and the 
Americans would begin replacing their Honest Johns with the MGM-
52 Lance in 1972.110 Maintaining the NATO status quo, then, was a 
positive choice requiring significant capital investment. This was the 
kind of global analysis, based on strategic-technical flexibility and a 
firm security-resource calculation, that Sutherland had been calling 
for since 1963.
The first major battle over defence policy ended with Trudeau’s 
statement to the media on 3 April 1969. Although reductions would 
be coming, Canada would remain in NATO and would continue to 
commit forces to Europe. At the core of the statement was a new 
listing of priorities for the armed forces:
107  Lindsey, Strategic Weapons Systems, Stability, and the Possible Contribution by 
Canada, 33-36. See also “The Defence Policy Review,” February 1969, 14, 8.13, vol. 
2, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
108  “The Defence Policy Review,” February 1969, 101-02, 8.13, vol. 2, 87/253, 
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
109  “The Defence Policy Review,” February 1969, 102-03, 8.13, vol. 2, 87/253, 
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
110  Stephen A. Gomes, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War Era…A Blast 
from the Past,” Combating WMD Journal 3 (2009): 51; and “MGR Honest John 
(M31 / M190),” Jane’s IHS, accessed 8 April 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/
Display/jsws0591-jsws.
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a) the surveillance of our own territory and coast-lines […]
b) the defence of North America in co-operation with United States forces;
c) the fulfilment of such NATO commitment as may be agreed upon; and
d) the performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may, 
from time to time, assume.111
This was an inversion of the priorities of the 1964 white paper, which 
put peacekeeping on top, and has been condemned by John English 
and others as unwarranted political meddling in military thinking.112 
On one level, the new priorities came out of an intensely political 
process. But it was a technically-informed political process and 
DRAE studies had listed a similar order of priorities for increasingly 
scarce defence resources as far back as 1963, when a programming 
study listed the following as a priority for resource allocation:
1. Defence of Canada
2. Continental Air Defence
3. Defence of NATO Europe
4. Maritime Warfare 
5. UN forces113 
A balance of probabilities suggests that Lindsey’s and Sutherland’s 
thinking had an impact on the re-prioritisation of Canadian defence 
commitments during the DPR. Concerns about a mismatch among 
priorities, means and roles had circulated among Canadian strategists 
throughout the 1960s. Further, it is also clear that Sutherland’s and 
Lindsey’s ideas had a wide enough exposure at enough levels of 
government to make a real impact on thinking about these problems. 
Sutherland’s idea of an “involuntary guarantee,” for example, came 
up in a 1987 interview with John F. Anderson, who contributed 
to the DPR and went on to become Assistant Deputy Minister for 
Policy in 1978. Moreover, the similarity in wording between elements 
of the DPR and Lindsey’s presentation to SCEAND suggests that 
many DRAE contributions to the report survived the bureaucratic 
111  Trudeau, “A defence policy for Canada: Statement to the press on April 3 1969,” 
3 April 1969, 20.7, vol. 4, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.  
112  English, Lament for an Army, 52-53; and Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 
237.
113  Sutherland, “Budgeting and programming as tools of defence management,” 21 
October 1963, 15-16, III.7, vol. 5, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
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“churn” virtually unharmed, with the result that both their ideas 
and their language shaped official policy documents. The DPR was 
only the first battle and the campaign continued as External Affairs 
led a more comprehensive foreign policy review while DND forged 
ahead with a new white paper, Defence in the ’70s, released in 
August 1971.
Donald MacDonald oversaw the drafting of Defence in the ‘70s 
after taking over as defence minister in September 1970. Despite 
being sceptical of NATO, MacDonald was constrained by the Prime 
Minister’s statement of 3 April 1969. NATO membership was settled, 
no further troop cuts were contemplated and no more money was 
coming. Moreover, MacDonald and his advisors did not operate 
in isolation. The “seminars” continued as did Trudeau’s direct 
participation in policy development—his relentless push for conceptual 
clarity would keep DRAE busy. In a memorandum to Cabinet on 3 
November 1969, the Prime Minister addressed the renewal of the 
SAC overflights and refuelling agreement and suggested a review 
of arrangements that allowed for the dispersal of US interceptors to 
Canadian airfields during an emergency. Could continued Canadian 
support be misconstrued as assistance to a US first-strike capability? 
He then proposed that “Canadian territory be used solely for 
purposes which are defensive in the judgement of the Government of 
Canada.”114 The DRAE commentary on these concerns, and the final 
wording of the white paper on this issue, suggests how much of an 
influence Lindsey had on the final product. In a draft commentary, 
DRAE took issue with the word “defensive.” In the nuclear context, 
Lindsey argued that “‘defensive’, and its opposite ‘offensive’ are 
terms so easily capable of manipulation as to be the source of endless 
argument and confusion.”115 Lindsey returned to his position from 
the DPR: what mattered was maintaining the strategic balance and 
disincentivising further Soviet bomber or submarine production.116 He 
put forth an alternative wording for a policy statement where, instead 
114  Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 236-37; and Pierre Trudeau to Léo Cadieux, 
“North American Defence Policy,” 3 November 1969, II.8.11b, vol. 1, 87/253, 
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
115  G.R. Lindsey, “Early Draft of Commentary on the PM’s Memo for Cabinet 
on North American Defence,” 14 November 1969, II.8.10, vol. 1, 87/253, Lindsey-
Sutherland fonds, DHH.
116  G.R. Lindsey (presumed), “Draft – Defence, Offence and Deterrence,” 17 
November 1967, II.8.11, vol. 1, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
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of “defensive” roles, Canada would take on those “purposes which 
in the Canadian government contribute to the maintenance of peace 
and the deterrence of nuclear war.”117 
In the end, much of Defence in the ‘70s sounded much more 
like the DRAE commentary than the Prime Minister’s memo. Some 
sections read as if pulled directly from DRAE papers. The section on 
nuclear deterrence notes that: 
[…] from a potential enemy’s point of view, however, North America 
can only logically be seen as one set of targets. Canada’s centres of 
population and industry logically form part of the major target plan for 
a strategic nuclear attack on North America.118
This notion, and even much of the wording, had a long pedigree 
in Canadian strategic thinking. As far back as 1962, Sutherland 
had argued:
Owing to the close integration of the American and Canadian economies, 
an attempt to destroy the productive capacity of the United States 
would almost certainly result in some Canadian targets being attacked. 
The two countries constitute a single target system: it would not make 
sense to attack the United States and leave Canada alone.119
Individual nuclear systems were thus less important for the fact that 
they were nuclear than that they were an efficient use of Canadian 
military resources in a way that would promote a stable strategic 
balance and support upcoming arms limitation negotiations.120 
The AIR-2 Genie remained in the Canadian inventory in order “to 
play an effective role in the defence of North America against a 
massive nuclear attack” and was eventually phased out alongside US 
stockpiles in the mid-1980s.121 The BOMARC was retired, largely 
117  Lindsey, “Early Draft of Commentary on the PM’s Memo for Cabinet on North 
American Defence,” 14 November 1969, II.8.10, vol. 1, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland 
fonds, DHH.
118  Department of National Defence, Defence in the ‘70s: White Paper on Defence 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1971), 25. For the purposes of this study, the 1971 White 
Paper on Defence will be referred to as Defence in the ‘70s.
119  Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 204.
120  Specifically, SALT I, which began in 1969. Department of National Defence, 
Defence in the ‘70s, 4-7.
121  Department of National Defence, Defence in the ‘70s, 30.
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because it was obsolete; it was similarly phased out of US service in 
1972.122 A prime minister who had branded Pearson as a “defrocked 
prince of peace”123 for accepting the nuclear warheads in 1963 ended 
up keeping some of those very same warheads in Canadian hands for 
nearly twenty years. 
Defence in the ‘70s is far less clear about NATO nuclear roles. 
The retirement of the Honest John and the end of the CF-104 strike/
reconnaissance roles were mentioned, but not described in detail.124 
This is partly because NATO force reductions had been implemented 
in 1969, well before the white paper was released. The decision to 
reduce the size of Canada’s forces and relocate them from the Central 
Front to a reserve role has been discussed extensively elsewhere,125 
but it is worth noting that elements of the rationale—giving the 
Canadian forces in Europe a “distinct Canadian identity”—goes back 
to the Sutherland Report.126 As for the change in the CF-104’s role, 
the paper gave very little strategic rationale for abandoning strike/
reconnaissance. DRAE analyses had generally been supportive of the 
role in raw strategic terms but these same analyses argued that it was 
inefficient to maintain separate fleets of aircraft for North American 
air defence and NATO tasks. Given that the CF-5 purchased by 
the Liberals had failed as an attempt to replace the Starfighters five 
years earlier, it is somewhat understandable that the white paper 
avoided such an awkward conversation.
122  It is difficult to ascertain exactly when this missile was retired from US service. 
Boeing claims the “early 1980s,” whereas the National Museum of the United States 
Air Force claims “mid 1980s.” See “MB-1/AIR-2 Genie Missile,” Boeing, accessed 23 
May 2019, http://www.boeing.com/history/products/mb-1-air-2-genie-missile.page; 
and “McDonnell Douglas AIR-2A Genie Rocket,” National Museum of the United 
States Air Force, accessed 23 May 2019,  https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/
Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/197594/mcdonnell-douglas-air-2a-
genie-rocket/.
123  Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 299.
124  Department of National Defence, Defence in the ‘70s, 30.
125  See especially Roy Rempel, Counterweights: The Failure of Canada’s German 
and European Policy 1955-1995 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1996).
126  Department of National Defence, Defence in the ’70s, 34.
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conclusions
Defence in the ’70s was about much more than nuclear weapons. 
There are wide swathes of the paper that have little to do with 
strategy and bear no signs of DRAE influence. There are other 
portions—such as the composition of the reduced Canadian ground 
forces in Europe—where DRAE analysts did have much to say, but 
those subjects are outside the scope of this paper. Some of the text 
in the white paper, such as those claiming the suitability of the 
CF-5 for operations in Europe, were plainly wrong and undoubtedly 
bothered Lindsey as much as the pilots who had to fly them.127 
Granatstein and Bothwell have good reason to describe the force 
reductions, budget reductions and organisational restructuring of the 
Trudeau years as a “long, dark night of the spirit” for the Canadian 
military.128 In terms of nuclear weapons divestment, however, the 
question must be reiterated: was the decision to partially denuclearise 
driven solely by political “amateurs” or did professional strategists 
have an influence?
The balance of probabilities indicates that many of Lindsey’s and 
Sutherland’s ideas provided a strategic grammar that shaped both 
denuclearisation and wider defence policy documents. There was a 
clear pathway for their analyses to move from DRAE to decision 
makers and advisors. Moreover, given the lack of similar advisory 
bodies in government or think tanks in the 1960s, there were few rival 
conceptualisations for policymakers to draw from. Even where there 
were disagreements about nuclear policy, many of the disagreements 
employed a strategic grammar provided by Lindsey and Sutherland. 
To have Sutherland’s “involuntary guarantee” referred to by a 
former assistant deputy minister more than two decades after the 
publication of “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation” speaks to 
the importance of the concept in shaping Canadian thinking on the 
technical and geographical aspects of its alliances. 
It may be tempting to argue that this strategic grammar was 
nothing more than a convenient lexicon to smooth policy changes at 
the Cabinet level with the polish of “objective” thinking, but a close 
look at final policy products indicates otherwise. The mere existence 
of a Sutherland Report in contemporary government vernacular, and 
127  Department of National Defence, Defence in the ‘70s, 35-36.
128  Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 234.
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the similarity of the report to the 1964 White Paper on Defence, 
makes a clear case that he had a direct influence on government 
policy. In Lindsey’s case, Trudeau’s acceptance of a strategic 
balancing, instead of strategic defence, serves as an instance where 
Lindsey’s arguments had a clear impact in shaping Canadian defence 
policy. Other, more conditional similarities, such as the similarity in 
language between Lindsey’s presentation to SCEAND and the DPR, 
suggest that this was not a singular event and that the influence 
survived both Sutherland’s death and Trudeau’s ascent. Pittfield’s 
observation that many in the DEA viewed Lindsey with hostility not 
because of his ideas, but specifically because of his rival influence on 
policy, is a telling one. In normal society, imitation is the subtlest 
form of flattery. In a bureaucracy, it is jealousy.
The strategic dependency thesis elaborated by Gray is somewhat 
weaker in light of this analysis. Not only were Canadian strategists 
thinking about wider nuclear issues, they were thinking about them in 
a way that was directly applicable to their national strategic context. 
This finding strengthens Richter’s thesis and historians studying 
Canadian defence and nuclear policy during this era should consider 
how Canadian strategic thinkers interacted with a wider body of 
thinking on nuclear issues during the Cold War.
The reader should also question whether the near-total allocation 
of responsibility for partial denuclearisation given to Pierre 
Trudeau—the Trudeau ex machina explanation—is sustainable. 
Trudeau undoubtedly had a large influence on Canadian defence 
and foreign policies. But Trudeau’s push for a rethink on nuclear 
issues had precedents. Many of the questions asked in 1968 had 
been asked as far back as 1962, reiterated in the Sutherland 
Report of 1963 and touched on in the 1964 White Paper. Political 
lethargy and service parochialism created an increasingly large gulf 
between Canada’s economic and strategic situation and its military 
ambitions. By 1963, even notable military officers like Guy Simonds, 
one of Canada’s best battlefield commanders and Chief of the 
General Staff from 1951-1955, and Charles Foulkes, Canada’s first 
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (1951-1960), publicly 
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opposed Canada’s nuclear commitments to NATO.129 Serious 
contradictions in Canadian defence policy had underpinned many 
of the nation’s nuclear acquisitions and someone as intellectually 
rigorous as Trudeau was bound to find them. 
The DRB did not escape the upheaval of the Trudeau years. 
Reorganisations in the 1970s separated DRAE from the rest of the 
operational research establishment and tucked it under the Assistant 
Deputy Minister for Policy.130 Lindsey, however, passed the torch. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, The Canadian Defence Quarterly, which had 
been host to many forward-thinking articles about doctrine in the 
interwar period, was reborn. Ironically, its first feature article was 
by Colin S. Gray, who propounded Canada’s lack of strategists.131 It 
was also at this time that DND began sponsoring strategic studies at 
Canadian universities, allowing for an academic treatment of defence 
problems from a uniquely Canadian perspective.132 The era of strategic 
thought that began with Sutherland’s contributions in the 1950s and 
ended with the Trudeau reviews had passed. A new generation of 
thinkers would have to take on the intractable problems of a country 
described by Desmond Morton as “simultaneously indefensible and 
invulnerable.”133
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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